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MARTHA MINOW· 
INTRODUCTION 
Jay Katz's probing book, The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient 1 
affords a close look at the secluded world of doctor-patient relation­
ships.  With sensitivity to both the political and psychological dimen­
sions  of power  in  those  relationships,  the  book  demonstrates  how 
doctors' control of information and decisionmaking for their patients 
historically has served seemingly paradoxical human needs.  On the 
one hand, doctors have responded to patients' desires for care-and 
yet on the other, they have abandoned patients by ignoring the whole 
person and demanding passive  surrender to their ministrations (pp. 
207-09). Doctors have advanced their own desires for power, and doc­
tors also have acted to deny the pain of their patients, and to avoid 
confrontation  with  universal  human  powerlessness  before  severe 
threats to health and life. 
Jay Katz's exploration of the silent world of doctor and patient 
made me wonder whether there are similar silent worlds bounded by 
other  relationships.  Locating  human  relationships  on  a  spectrum, 
moving from the most intimate and daily toward the least familiar and 
most discontinuous, I imagine we could place family relationships on 
the first  end,  and relations  between strangers on  the other.  Falling 
somewhere in between would be relationships established and limited 
by  contract,  including  professional-client  bonds.  And standing be­
yond these relations-but also shaping each of them-are the special 
and  unavoidable  relationships between the state and the individual. 
Does the search for conversations and shared decisionmaking between 
doctors and patients, as advocated by Jay Katz, hold promise for peo­
ple in these other kinds of relationships?  I will speculate about these 
other  contexts,  and  close  with  a  thought  about  the  continuing 
problems of silence. 
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I.  A  RANGE OF RELATIONSHIPS 
A.  Parents and Children 
Analogies between the paternalism of doctors and the paternal­
ism of parents are not difficult to draw.  Combining the role of care­
giver with the assumptions of knowledge and expertise, both doctors 
and parents can, and often have,  adopted a stance of "I know best" 
with regard to those under their care. Like doctors, parents have long 
enjoyed a presumption of acting in the interests of those they care for. 2 
And yet this presumption increasingly has come under both factual 
and philosophic challenge.3  Statistics about child abuse and neglect,4 
child abandonment, and parent/child conflict over issues such as teen 
sexuality5  challenge the assumption that parents and children always 
share the same interests.  If  left unchallenged within legal  doctrines 
about families,  the assumption that parents and children share inter­
ests can disguise and perpetuate severe risks for many children.  Ex­
treme risks  from  unchecked  parental power include  the dangers of 
child abuse, undue punishment for misbehavior, and exclusion from a 
range of opportunities and experiences that the child might want or 
need.6 Short of  these extreme risks, parental power may have devastat­
ing effects on the child's formation of a sense of self. 
Psychoanalyst Alice Miller explored some of these consequences 
for  the child whose  parents,  preoccupied with their own needs,  de­
2.  See, e.g., Parham v.  J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (Georgia statute providing for 
voluntary admission of children under 18 to state hospitals with parental consent, did not 
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). 
3.  Nevada v. Bill_ and Muriel _, 91  Nev. 275, 534 P.2d 1264 (1975) (child aban­
doned in garbage container).  See also Miller & Miller, Protecting the Rights ofAbused and 
Neglected Children,  19 TRIAL,  June 1983, at 68. 
4.  From 1978 to  1982, the incidence of child abuse and neglect cases rose from 2.7 
cases per 1000 to 4.0 cases per 1000.  Statstics taken from an ongoing study entitled "Na­
tional Study on Child Abuse and Neglect" funded by the American Humane Association 
and the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. 
5.  See Mnookin, Belotti v.  Baird: A Hard Case,  in  IN THE  INTEREST OF CHILDREN: 
ADVOCACY,  LAW  REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY  150,  155-60 (R. Mnookin, ed.  1985) (giv­
ing statistics showing sharp increase in teen sexual activity and motherhood and discussing 
teenagers' difficulties discussing sex with parents).  This essay also provides a detailed case 
study of the successful constitutional challenge to legislation requiring parental consent to 
minors' abortions, and reveals the mixed legacy of Massachusetts' response of individual­
ized judicial hearings to avoid parental consent. 
6.  Similarly, assumptions about mutuality of interests among family  members can 
shield from  public or legal  review  risks and  harms some family  members pose  to others. 
Recent exposes about the abuse of spouses and of elderly relatives reveal other silent worlds 
of misused power within the family.  See, e.g., Eastman, Elders Under Seige,  PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY, Jan. 1984, at 30; O'Riely, Wife-Beating:  The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept.  5,  1983, at 
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mand performance, excellence, and compliance but give little regard 
for  the child's individual and personal needs.7  The child's desire to 
please the parent may lead to the construction of  a false self, accompa­
nied by rejection and shame about the child's innermost feelings. 8  In 
the name of guiding the child toward successful adulthood, the parent 
may thus silence the child's own needs so powerfully that the child can 
no longer acknowledge them.  Alternatively, the child may grow de­
pendent on the parent while the parent comes to enjoy and rely on that 
dependence.  This pattern could hamper the potential for growth for 
both parent and child-and for their relationship over time. 
Yet what are the alternatives?  Within the family dynamic itself, 
pretending that the parent is a "friend" of the child instead of a parent 
could prove disastrous.  Denying power differentials, and denying how 
different roles and responsibilities shape the contours and identity of a 
relationship, simply would preserve sources of silence and repression. 
The doctor possesses what the patient does not: knowledge and exper­
tise about medical treatment, and legal responsibility for  medical ad­
vice.  So,  too,  does  the  parent have  much that the child does  not: 
resources, knowledge about the world, and legal and moral responsi­
bilities to care for the child.  Rejecting the legal presumption that par­
ents  act  in  their  children's  interests  could  justify  limitless  state 
investigations  and  involvement  with  families,  especially  given  the 
vague and controversial criteria for such governmental activities.9 
Jay Katz's work suggests that in the analogous situation of the 
doctor and patient, disparities in power, knowledge, and role can mark 
the beginning, not the end, of conversation.  Perhaps parents and chil­
dren, too, can engage in conversations about needs, desires, roles, and 
obligations, at least once the child is able to communicate and reason. 
Children do learn to say "no" quite early, \0 and in so doing challenge 
parents to  seek  compliance through persuasion.  Yet  children  learn 
very quickly that the reason offered by a parent for refusing a child's 
7.  A.  MILLER,  DRAMA  OF  THE GIFTED CHILD (1981). 
8.  Id.  at 49-58. 
9.  See  Mnookin, Foster  Care-In  Whose  Best  Interest,  43  HARV.  ED.  REV.  158 
(1973). 
10.  Indeed, it is this capacity that gives twenty-four-month-olds the label, "the terri­
ble twos."  See  R.  KEGAN,  THE EVOLVING  SELF:  PROBLEMS  AND  PROCESS  IN  HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 83 (1982).  The differentiation between self and others hinted at during this 
stage along with subsequent cognitive developments assure that the child, as an independ­
ent person, can ask for reasons and can choose to accept them.  Id.  at 83-110; J.  KAGAN, 
THE NATURE  OF  THE  CHILD  112-53  (1984).  See also  Pines, Children's  Winning  Ways, 
PSYCHOLOGY  TODAY,  Dec.  1984, at 58  (some children are naturally skilled at silent per­
suasion; their rewards are affection and power).  See generally J.  PIAGET, THE LANGUAGES 
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desire can acquire an independent life, and the child can cite the rea­
son the next time around.  This begins a conversation that may indeed 
hold the parent accountable and put the parent to the test of persuad­
ing the child.  Is this a promising direction for family relations? 
A  commitment to conversation can hardly resolve  the looming 
problems of child abuse and neglect and similar consequences of un­
checked parental power.  Moreover,  I  would be wary of a legal rule 
premised on a commitment to conversation between parent and child 
given the backdrop risks of abusive exercise of parental power.  A state 
law requiring a pregnant adolescent to communicate with her parents 
before seeking  an  abortion,  for  example,  could  subject  the child  to 
abuse rather than promote trusting relations. 11  Perhaps the commit­
ment to conversation demands a deeper look at the legal, social, and 
economic settings in  which parents and children relate.  What would 
laws governing families look like if designed to be conducive to trust­
ing, communicative relations between parent and child, while still per­
mitting external checks on abusive use of unequal power within the 
relationship?  I suspect that it is  this kind of deeper inquiry that Jay 
Katz points to in the context of doctors and patients as  well. 
Professor Katz's analysis  interweaves  historical  evidence about 
doctors' ideologies and political struggles with a study of the micro­
politics of doctor-patient dynamics  (pp.  30-47).  With this  textured 
analysis, his inquiry into how doctors and patients together give mean­
ing to authority, autonomy, and certainty in their shared interactions 
yields a vivid sense of how power is constructed in relationships, and 
how relationships have both social and psychological dimensions (pp. 
85-90).  The analysis reveals how conflict between patients and doctors 
is inevitable, given their separateness.  Not even doctors--or parents­
who sincerely believe they work in another's interests avoid this con­
flict (p.  100).  Trusting relations, Professor Katz concludes, must build 
on a  recognition of potential conflict,  inequalities of experience and 
irrational as well  as  rational expectations between doctor and patient 
(pp.  99-102). 
By  analogy,  thoughtful  inquiry  into  parent-child  relationships 
would also start by recognizing potential conflicts of interest, inequali­
ties of strength and experience, and irrational as well as  rational mo­
tives  that  parents and  children  bring  to  their  relationships.  Trust 
11.  H. L.  v.  Matheson, 450 U.S.  398,  438-39 (1981) (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).  See 
Comment, Parent versus Child; H.  L.  v.  Matheson and the New Abortion Litigation,  1982 
WIS. L.  REV. 75,  115 ("parental notification rights requirements present an unprecedented 
interference in intra-family communication and relationships, and may have serious conse­
quences to the physical and emotional health of pregnant teenagers"). 1987]  MANY SILENT WORLDS  201 
cannot be imposed or demanded.  Instead, like doctors, parents need 
to surrender their own power to shield abuses  from  view  and make 
themselves  vulnerable by  sharing  their own  uncertainties. 12  Yet  to 
whom should parents surrender their pretense of certainty?  Not to 
infants  or very  young  children,  although  even  in  the case  of very 
young children, rather than hiding behind pretended certainty parents 
could share doubts with other adults (neighbors, relatives, or friends), 
with better consequences for the parent-child relationship. 
B.  Professionals and Clients 
A similar, deeper inquiry may be necessary to address the condi­
tions of distrust between clients and professionals other than doctors. 
Mounting numbers of malpractice suits against not only doctors, \3 but 
also lawyers,14  accountants,15 and engineersl6 hint at the unsatisfac­
tory qualities of communication and service within the ongoing rela­
tionships between professional and client.  Interestingly,  malpractice 
suits may express the failure of a solely contractual approach to the 
law governing professional services.  People bring to professional rela­
tionships expectations and desires to invest their trust in someone with 
expertise.  Malpractice suits represent a collateral assault on those re­
lationships when such expectations and desires are unfulfilled.  Con­
tractual  boundaries  on  those  relationships  cannot  contain  such 
expectations, especially when clients suffer injury at the hand, or by 
the neglect, of their hired professional. 
Malpractice suits often betray failures not just in the services pro­
vided, but also in the communication in the course of the professional 
relationships.  Again, Jay Katz's insights about doctors and patients 
suggest  that the  real  work  to  be  done  in  professional  relationships 
must take place long before a malpractice suit.  The professionals must 
learn to  share information,  critical facts,  and analysis  of risks  with 
12.  Cf Minow, Beyond State Intervention in  the Family:  For Baby Jane Doe,  18  U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 988-1009 (1985) (building trust in debates over medical treatment for 
handicapped newborns should start with recognition of distrust and antagonism). 
13.  See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity ofMedical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. 
&  ECON.  liS (1984).  See generally Mechanic, Some Social Aspects ofthe Medical Malprac­
tice Dilemma, 1975  DUKE  L.J.  1179,  1183 (malpractice suits related to loss of trust). 
14.  See  Gates,  The  Newest  Data  on  Lawyers Malpractice  Claims,  A.B.A.  J.,  Apr. 
1984, at 79. 
IS.  See Collins, ProfeSSional Liability:  The Situation  Worsens,  J.  ACCT.,  Nov.  1985, 
at 57. 
16.  According to a  1982  article,  the incidence of claims against engineers per 100 
insurance policies was 36.3/100 in  1978; 44.2/100 in  1979; and 45/100 in  1982.  Berreby, 
Architects After the Fall,  NAT'L.  L.J., July  19,  1982, at 31,  col. 4. 202  WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  9:197 
clients;  clients must learn to demand  such sharing.  Professor Katz 
may,  however,  underestimate  the extent  to  which  younger  doctors 
have  already begun to communicate options to their patients, J7  but 
doctors often still fail to build the bases for trust by neglecting to edu­
cate  patients  to demand  and  then  scrutinize  critical  medical  judg­
ments.  The pressing question, then, is whether professionals can learn 
to help equip their clients to become self-empowered, critical monitors 
of professional power. What legal rules, aside from the crude tools of 
malpractice law, would promote this process?  These too are questions 
that emerge if we draw on the insights of Jay Katz (pp. 46-47). 
C.  Strangers and Strangers 
Just as  malpractice law has developed to express clients' disap­
pointed expectations with professionals and professional service con­
tracts, products liability law has communicated consumers' frustration 
with defective products and with consumer contracts law.  Breaking 
away from the exchange of party expectations captured by  contract 
law, these tort theories shock defendants with the power of plaintiffs' 
disappointments, and break the silence that might otherwise prevail 
between strangers. 
It may seem odd to include strangers at all in a discussion of in­
terpersonal relationships.  And yet it is  possible to see  a relationship 
between the stranger who produces a defective tire and the stranger 
who purchases it and suffers injury as  a result. It is a relationship of 
silence and distance.  The impossibility of conversation in this context 
may explain the development of strict liability rules over time,18 even 
though this same impossibility, in earlier times, justified immunity for 
the producer of the defective product. 19  Perhaps strict liability is the 
better solution, not just the more humane one, because a strict liability 
17.  Interview with Dr. Robert Singer, family physician in the Boston area (Mar. 16, 
1986). 
18.  See  Greenman v.  Yuba Power Products,  59  Cal.  2d  57,  377  P.2d  897  (1962) 
(consumer's lack of knowledge of a product's defect which makes the product unsafe for its 
intended use justifies recovery from the manufacturer if the consumer is injured while using 
the product for its intended purpose); Macpherson v.  Buick Motor Co., 217  N.Y. 382,  III 
N.E.  1050 (1916) (knowledge of a probable danger and of the fact  that a product will be 
used by  people other than the buyer is  enough to charge a manufacturer with a duty in­
dependent  of its  contract).  Accord RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TORTS  §  402A(2)(a) 
(1977) (seller is liable for injuries attributable to product even if the seller has exercised all 
possible care in  the preparation and sale of his product). 
19.  See,  e.g., Winterbottom v.  Wright, 10 M. & w.  109 (ex. Ch.  1842) (lack ofpriv­
ity,  and  therefore,  communication  between  manufacturer and  user justifies  restricting  a 
cause  of action  for  injuries  only  to  those  who  entered  into  a  contract  regarding  the 
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rule in effect  breaks the silence.  Strict liability communicates to the 
producer the risk of injury to the buyer, and invites the producer to 
internalize the needs of the buyer in advance of any injury.  Jay Katz's 
work, then, offers a way to think about even the rules governing  rela­
tionships between strangers as ways to break silence, bridge the gaps in 
communication, and check previously unchecked power. 
D.  States and Individuals 
There is one more set of relationships that may also be marked by 
silence, power and dependency.  Each individual has a continuing rela­
tionship with the state, whether or not the individual ever breaks a law 
or appears before a judge.  Even in private dealings between individu­
als, the state offers a continuing presence as the enforcer and protector 
of individual rights and freedoms.20  Indeed, the reliance of individu­
als, under our legal system, on rights enforced by the state, could be 
understood as part of a pattern of dependency about which we remain 
largely silent.  And this silence may undermine the possibilities for re­
alizing democracy in practice. 
How could this be  so?  For rights to have meaning,  they must 
exist in their enforceability by the state, not only in individuals' sensi­
bilities about their own entitlements.  Yet this demand for enforceabil­
ity makes the individuals dependent on the state, and on  particular 
state officials'  willingness  to  recognize  and give  meaning to  a given 
asserted right in a particular factual context.  It  is also true, as with all 
relationships of power, that this dependence works two ways.  Unless 
individuals seek  legal  enforcement of their rights,  the state officials 
have little occasion to exercise power.  And the state's power, at least 
ideally, is guided by the shape of the claims of rights individuals  can 
use to persuade state officials.  Power, then, is  the quality of the rela­
tionships between people, not a quantitative item parceled out in some 
dim, dark past. 
Would it be possible for individuals to experience their rights not 
as supplicants for state enforcement but as crafters of their own self­
governance?  Many political philosophers have speculated about this 
issue.21  I am most taken by those who make central to their specula­
20.  See  Olsen, The Myth ofState Intervention in the Family,  18  U.  MICH. J.L. REF. 
835,  836-42  (1985)  (examining laws  governing families  by  reinforcing  parental or state 
authority). 
21.  See,  e.g., K. MARX,  CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 31  (A. Jolin 
& J. O'Malley trans. 1970) (state cannot govern for the good of all unless it is controlled by 
all); J.  S.  MILL,  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT  341-50 (Great Books ed.  1952) (1861) 
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tions the individual's need for communal identity as part of the indi­
vidual's political and civil rights.22  Moving toward these speculations, 
in practice, requires at least the initial step of speaking about our inter­
dependence.  We must, in turn, speak about the problems of founding 
relationships between state and individual on the basis  of unspoken 
dependence.  Again, Jay Katz's work provides an initial lexicon, a lan­
guage to discuss  what has not often been discussed:  the patterns of 
dependency, power, and silence within relationships. 
II.  FINDING WORDS FOR SILENCE 
The hope of finding  words where there has  been  silence,  then, 
provides a direction for legal and nonlegal efforts to challenge abuses 
of power.  Yet this hope must be modulated by the sobering recogni­
tion of complexity.  Each person is  simultaneously involved in more 
than one relationship, and these involvements influence the construc­
tion and experience of power. A woman's support in her intimate rela­
tionships, for example, may strengthen her stance as a professional;  or 
it may instead contribute to deeper experiences of dependency. 
Feelings  of powerlessness  may  at times  preclude  speech,  even 
speech about powerlessness.  In this context, I am reminded of a poem 
so expressive of the difficulties in finding words that it conveys silence 
even as it speaks. 
The poet W.  S.  Merwin wrote this short, abrupt verse,  entitled 
"Elegy":23 
Who would I show it to 
Ending with a preposition, in mid-thought; ending without punctua­
tion,  and relying on reference without definition; stand-in words like 
"who," "I," and "it" for undisclosed references: the poem is perplex-
ideal form of government; best way for individuals to enjoy rights is to stand up for them); 
MONTESQUIEU,  THE SPIRIT OF  LAWS,  BOOKS  II, III, IV (T. Nugent trans. Great Books 
ed.  1952) (1748) (comparing government by law rather than despotism, and commending 
education for a democracy that imbues love of law); J. J. ROUSSEAU,  SOCIAL  CONTRACT, 
BOOK III 411-12 (G. Cole trans. Great Books ed.  1952) (1792) (true democracy is impossi­
ble because people cannot remain assembled to govern their affairs and it is best to have the 
wisest govern). 
22.  See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN  CONDITION,  (1958); J. COHEN & J.  ROGERS,  ON 
DEMOCRACY:  TOWARD A TRANSITION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); M. SANDEL,  LIB­
ERALISM  AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Wolin, Revolutinary Action Today, in POST­
ANALYTIC  PHILOSOPHY  244 (J.  Rajchman &  C.  West eds.  1985). 
23.  w. S. MERWIN, "Elegy," in THE CARRIER OF LADDERS:  POEMS BY W. S.  MER­
WIN  137 (1978). 205  1987]  MANY SILENT WORLDS 
ing.24  Incompletion and dependence on what remains forever unsaid 
weigh  heavily in the poem, and at least in some measure, may be its 
message.  Yet,  probing  for  some  more specific  meaning,  the  reader 
could try to relate to the text and draw from the reader's own experi­
ence.  "Why such incompletion?" the reader can ask.  What could be 
the "it" in the poem-perhaps the elegy  in the title.  The "I"-per­
haps the poet.  The "who"-perhaps no one known, no one alive.  Per­
haps the poem means the poet's relationship with someone has been so 
interrupted, so cut off, perhaps by death, that the very idea of memori­
alizing the lost one seems futile.  The one person who could under­
stand and appreciate the poet's efforts to write an elegy is gone.  The 
possibility of mourning that could reach closure is so dim that the poet 
cannot even complete the thought about how to try. 
And yet, if any of this discussion echoes the meanings the author 
intended or meanings sensed by readers other than me,  another twist 
in the meaning remains.  If  I  am able  to grasp some portion of the 
poet's  thought and feeling,  some  sense  of how  great  would  be  the 
poet's grief,  loss,  and interruption that produces such a statement of 
the  impossibility  of statement,  then  indeed  the poet  has  communi­
cated.  And the silence, between strangers, between author and reader, 
has indeed been  broken.  Conversation where there has been  silence 
may best begin this way, in expressions of what has been and perhaps 
remains inexpressible.  Our ability to say just that may help us share, 
and therefore, transform our silent worlds. 
24.  My  understanding of the poem has been enhanced by R.  SCHOLES, SEMIOTICS 
AND INTERPRETATION 37-40 (1982). 